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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Petitioner, 
vs. 
JAMES L. ROBISON, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
Case No. 20050257-SC 
BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
* * * 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This case is before the Court on a writ of certiorari to the Utah Court of 
Appeals. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(5) (West 
2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Should the court of appeals have reversed a felony conviction on a novel 
question of law that was neither raised nor briefed by either party? 
Standard of Review. Courts have discretion to decide any issue "necessary to a 
proper decision." Kaiserman Assoc, Inc. v. Francis Town, 977 P.2d 462, 464 (Utah 
1998). This court therefore reviews the court of appeals actions for abuse of 
discretion. 
2. Does Utah's bad check statute, which prohibits issuing a bad check "for 
the purpose of obtaining... any money, property, or other thing of value/' require a 
"substantially contemporaneous exchange"? 
Standard of Review. This issue concerns a question of statutory interpretation 
that this Court reviews for correctness. See State v. husk, 2001 UT 102, \ 11,37 P.3d 
1103. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
This appeal requires interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505 (West 2004), 
attached as Addendum B. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE1 
In the fall of 2001, defendant, a licensed car dealer, had a customer who 
wanted a GMC three-quarter ton pickup truck (R. 396:8). He contacted Randy 
Painter, another car dealer, to help him find the specific truck his customer wanted 
(R. 396:5-6). Painter agreed and within a month had found and purchased a truck 
for defendant (R. 145,150; 396:4-5). Defendant picked the truck up from the Painter 
on September 1, 2001, and took it to show to his customer (R. 396:8). As was 
customary among dealers, defendant did not pay for the truck or sign a purchase 
contract at that time (R. 396:13). Instead, he took the truck with the understanding 
1
 The facts of the crime are taken from the victim's testimony at a hearing on a 
motion to quash a search warrant, at which defendant was present (R. 396). 
2 
that if his customer wanted it, Painter would sell it to defendant for $40,812 (R. 
396:9). 
Defendant contacted Painter that same day and told him that his customer 
wanted the truck (R. 396:10). He said that he would get a check in the mail to 
Painter, and Painter expected, as was customary with a dealer to dealer transaction, 
that defendant would pay him within a couple of days (R. 396:11). Sometime 
between September 12th and September 15th, Painter received a check from 
defendant for $40,812 (R. 396:11). The check bounced (R. 128; 396:12). 
Painter left several messages on defendant's answering machine about the 
bounced check (R. 396:15). He also went looking for defendant, but could not find 
him (396:15). On September 25, 2001, defendant faxed Painter a copy of a receipt 
showing that he had deposited a second check for $40,812 into Painter's bank 
account (R. 121; 396:12). Painter assumed that defendant would not write two bad 
checks, so he mailed defendant the title (R. 396:18-19). A few days later, Painter 
received notice that the second check had also bounced (R. 122; 396:19). Defendant 
never made good on the dishonored checks and did not return the truck to Painter 
Motors, but rather, sold it to his customer (R. 6, 398:21). 
The State charged defendant with two counts of issuing a bad check and one 
count of theft by deception (R. 109-10). Defendant asserted that he did not use the 
check to induce Painter Motor to give him the truck, but rather, claimed the check 
3 
was for payment on an existing debt from an oral agreement to buy the truck (R. 
398:6-7). Defendant and the State negotiated a plea agreement to one count of 
issuing a bad check (R. 242-247,398). 
At the plea hearing, the parties disagreed as to whether defendant would 
plead guilty or no contest (R. 398:3-4). After some negotiation and explanation of 
the difference between a guilty plea and a no contest plea, defendant decided to 
plead guilty (R. 398:8). The court asked defendant whether he had reviewed the 
written statement in advance of plea with his attorney (R. 398:8-9). Defendant 
replied that he had (R. 398:9). The court asked defendant if he had any questions 
about the statement (R. 398:9). Defendant asked a question about restitution, which 
the court, defense counsel, and the prosecutor all carefully answered (R. 398:9-12). 
The court then reviewed with defendant the constitutional rights he would waive by 
pleading guilty including: the right to a speedy trial by an impartial jury, the right to 
require the State to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the right to confront and 
cross-examine witness, the right to subpoena witnesses, the privilege against self-
incrimination, and the right to appeal his conviction (R. 398:13-14). The court then 
explained the minimum and maximum sentence of one to fifteen years in prison and 
a $10,000 fine (R. 398:14). Defendant asked a question about the minimum sentence 
(R. 398-14-16). The court carefully explained to defendant how sentencing worked 
and the roles of the Board of Pardons and Parole and Adult Probation and Parole (R. 
4 
398:14-16). Defendant conferred with his attorney off the record and then told the 
court that he understood the maximum penalty (R. 398:16-17). 
The court asked defendant whether the plea was his "free voluntary act/7 to 
which defendant responded that it was (R. 398:19). The court then asked defendant 
to sign the statement in advance of plea (R. 398:20). Defendant again affirmed that 
he was pleading guilty to one count of issuing a bad check (R. 398:20). The 
prosecutor provided a factual basis for the plea, stating that defendant had issued a 
check in exchange for something of value on an account that was closed (R. 398:20). 
Defendant objected and stated that the account was not closed (R. 398:20). The court 
and defendant then held the following exchange: 
DEF: — payment was not, was not honored by the bank but the 
account was not closed. I have a letter in my file from the 
institution stating that it was open. 
JUDGE: Okay. You, you did issue a check which was not honored by 
your bank. Is that correct? 
DEF: That's correct. 
JUDGE: And a, upon notice of it not being honored did you, did you 
at any time make that check good? 
DEF: I attempted to, Your Honor, and my bonding company also 
attempted to, but we were not able to completely do it. 
JUDGE: Okay. And a, in exchange for that a car was delivered. Is 
that correct? A vehicle was— 
DEF: No. The car was delivered several weeks prior to that. 
JUDGE: Well, I mean— 
5 
DEF: There was a vehicle in, a transaction did involve a vehicle. 
JUDGE: Yes. Okay. And that vehicle had a value in excess of $5000? 
DEF: It did, Your Honor. 
JUDGE: The Court finds there's a factual basis, accepts your guilty 
plea, finds it was voluntarily and knowingly given with a full 
understanding of your constitutional rights. 
(R. 398:20-21). 
One month after the plea hearing, on November 15,2002, defendant moved 
pro se to withdraw his guilty plea (R. 250-52, attached as Appendix B). He claimed 
that the plea he entered at the hearing was "entirely different" from the earlier 
agreement he reached with the prosecutor (R. 251). He also claimed to have been 
confused, nervous, and unaware of the ramifications of the new arrangement (R. 
251). 
The court did not immediately rule on defendant's motion. Instead, on 
November 26, 2002, it sentenced defendant to a suspended prison term of one-to-
fifteen years and thirty-six months probation (R. 256-60). It stayed execution of the 
sentence, however, to allow defendant time to supplement his motion to withdraw 
his guilty plea (R. 256-60). 
By February 7,2003, defendant had filed no additional pleadings nor asked 
for any additional time on the stay, so the court entered an order denying his 
motion to withdraw (R. 283-82). In its written findings, the court found that the 
6 
plea colloquy strictly complied with rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (R. 
280, attached as Appendix C). It also found that "[although there was some initial 
confusion whether the defendant's plea was going to be a guilty plea or a no contest 
plea and the defendant had some questions concerning certain issues,... defendant 
entered his plea voluntarily, knowingly and with a full understanding of his 
constitutional rights" (R. 280-79). Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal to the 
court of appeals (R. 288-84). 
In the court of appeals, defendant retained new counsel and reasserted that 
the trial court failed to strictly comply with rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. See Br. Aplt. at 6. He claimed that during the plea colloquy there was no 
clear statement of the elements of the offense, that he did not admit to the elements 
of the offense, and that the written plea agreement was not clear and consistent. Id. 
He never specified, however, which element he claimed was not stated during the 
plea colloquy, nor did he specify which element of the offense he claimed he did not 
admit. 
The court of appeals did not set the case for oral argument. Instead, it 
reversed the trial court in a memorandum decision from which one judge dissented. 
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See State v. Robison, 2005 UT App 9,3.2 The majority opinion held that defendant's 
plea violated rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, because it lacked an 
adequate factual basis. Id. at 2-3. It first acknowledged that defendant "did not 
adequately present this issue either to the trial court or to this court/7 Id. at 1. The 
opinion concluded, however, that the court could reach the issue sua sponte in order 
"to avoid a 'great and manifest injustice/" Id. (quoting State v. Pierce, 655 P.2d 676, 
677 (Utah 1982)). 
The majority noted that one of the elements of issuing a bad check is that the 
defendant issue the check for the purpose of obtaining money, property, or anything 
of value. Id. at 2. It then held, without any further analysis and without citation to 
any authority, that "this element of section 76-6-505 requires a substantially 
contemporaneous exchange." Id. The majority then held that defendant's 
statement, "'The car was delivered several weeks prior to [issuance of bad check],'" 
was "a complete defense to the charge of issuing a bad check." Id. (quoting R. 
398:21 (alteration in original)). It further held that "[t]he check was irrelevant to the 
transaction involving the sale of the vehicle and simply amounted to payment on an 
2
 The court's opinion was not published and does not have numbered 
paragraphs. The pinpoint cites to the opinion therefore refer to the page number of 
the court's slip opinion, attached as Addendum A. 
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open account/7 Id. This Court subsequently granted the State's petition for review 
by writ of certiorari. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
The court of appeals abused its discretion when it reversed the trial court on a 
novel question of law that it raised sua sponte without briefing from the parties. 
"Great and manifest injustice" is not an invitation for an appellate court to fashion a 
claim never raised by the parties. Rather, it is merely an exception to the 
preservation rule. No Utah court has ever sua sponte raised and argued an issue on 
the basis of "great and manifest injustice." To do so places the court in the position 
of advocating on behalf of one party to the detriment of the other. This is both 
unwise and unnecessary. 
Moreover, the court misapplied the manifest injustice standard. A claim is 
only manifestly unjust if it is both obvious and harmful. The "substantially 
contemporaneous exchange" rule relied on by the court of appeals presented a 
question of first impression in Utah. It was thus not obvious to the trial court. The 
claim was also not harmful, because a substantially contemporaneous exchange is 
not a dispositive element of Utah's bad check statute. 
9 
POINT II 
The bad check statute's requirement that the check issue for the "purpose of 
obtaining" something of value does not require a substantially contemporaneous 
exchange. The "purpose of obtaining" element of the statute defines the requisite 
mental intent of the offender. While the chronology of the transaction is a factor in 
divining the offender's mental state, it is not a dispositive or even a necessary factor. 
The statute does not require that the check be exchanged for something of value or 
even that something of value be obtained. It only requires that the offender issue 
check "for the purpose of obtaining" something of value. 
ARGUMENT 
I. APPELLATE COURTS SHOULD NOT REVERSE ON NOVEL 
QUESTIONS OF LAW THAT ARE NEITHER RAISED NOR 
BRIEFED BY THE PARTIES 
A longstanding rule of appellate procedure in Utah dictates that claims that 
are not briefed "are deemed waived and abandoned." American Towers Owners 
Ass'n, Inc. v. CCIMechanical Inc., 930 P.2d 1182,1185 n.5 (Utah 1996); see also Pixton 
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. of Bloomington, III., 809 P.2d 746, 751 (Utah 1991) 
("Generally, where an appellant fails to brief an issue on appeal, the point is 
waived."); Reid v. Anderson, 211 P.2d 206, 208 (Utah 1949) ("Counsel who asserts 
error has the burden of showing that error exists. It is not our duty to search the 
record in quest for error."); Floor v. Johnson, 199 P.2d 547,551 (Utah 1948) (holding 
10 
Ilk ill el mrs iiotvin;iHYl in thr printed briefs are waived); Duncan v. Hemmelwright, 186 
P.2d 965, 968 (Utah 1947) (same); Parry v. Harris
 A 72 P.2d 1044, 1048 (Utah h~~7) 
(same). 
This Cour t has thus consistently refuses u> u e a u e cases on issues thai ihc 
part ies have mu rui:>cJ ^rLaicrea. *_;........ m.. w ..ii< ./.• •. ;•' - "iri" 
1._• M «' . . i . i ^, mbriefed 
issue s in spoiil"). !^ltitr ;< Vrmh\ 200i UT 97, 1 21 n.2, 57 P.3d 1052 (refusing to 
decide unbriefed consti tut ional issue); Utah Dep't ofEnvtl Qiidlity v. Redd, 2002 UT 
50, 1 21 n.7, 48 P.3d 230 (declining to reach issue neither pa r ty briefed); In re 
Coleman, 2000 UT 9 8 , 1 7,17 P.3d 11 22 ( [ I v ]e cannot, and do not, c.dai, - i _ wr 
the issues not briefed by A ; i K^O L<J n un i. ., :v«*:( . i ' • r M * - f 
v. Quint'' r:^k , .•.•W,;;;?;??;";,— <: : ,u<± r .2d 573, 577 n.4 (Utah 1985) (same). But see 
Brigham City v. Stuart, 2005 UT 13, f 22, 519 Utah Adv. Rep, 17 (discussing and 
rejecting claim under emergency aid doctrine, even though neither party raised or 
briefed claim).3 
The Court's opinion states that Brigham City presented a claim under the 
emergency aid doctrine. Sh tart, 2005 UT 13,1 21. A review of the parties' briefs, 
however, discloses that no such argument was made to this Court. 
At the same time, however, this Court has retained discretion to decide any 
issue necessary to a proper decision, regardless of whether the issue was raised and 
briefed. See, e.g., Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996,998-99 (Utah 1987) (reversing trial 
court for failure to make findings of fact and conclusions of law, even though 
neither party addressed absence of findings and conclusions). The court of appeals 
exercised that discretion when it held, without briefing from either party, that 
Utah's bad check statute requires "a substantially contemporaneous exchange/' 
State v. Robison, 2005 UT App 9,2 (unpublished memorandum decision). It did so 
on the basis of preventing "great and manifest injustice." Id. at 1-2 (quotations and 
citations omitted). The question now before this Court is whether "great and 
manifest injustice" is a proper basis for sua sponte raising an unbriefed novel 
question of law to reverse a lower court. 
This question involves exercise of the court's discretion to reach unbriefed 
issues, and the court of appeals actions are therefore reviewed for abuse of 
discretion. See Kaiserman Assoc, Inc. v. Francis Town, 977 P.2d 462,464 (Utah 1998). 
A. Neither case law nor sound judicial policy supports a court sua 
sponte raising and briefing a novel question of law on the 
basis of manifest injustice. 
A review of the phrase "great and manifest injustice" in Utah case law 
demonstrates that it is not an invitation for an appellate court to fashion a claim 
never raised by the parties. Rather, it is merely an exception to the preservation 
M if ill M nil i i 1111 \ r i nil i, thrice considered reaching an issue to avoid a "great 
and manifest injustice." See State v. Lesley, 672 P.2d 79, 81-82 (Utah 1983); State v. 
Pierce, 655 P.2d 676,677 (I T:.»h 1982) (per curiam); State v. Archambeau, 820 V2d °°0 
923 n.5 (Utah App. 1991). Tr each of these cases, the issue had been raised bv una 
briefed in the appellate ^<^ i. _ ^ A^ as unpresci \ u ;. i.-. 
whr thn Mir tri.il r« «i il violated her privilege against self-incrimination by granting 
the prosecutor's request that she try on a shoe during the trial. Pierce, 655 P.2d at 
677. After describing the issue and facts of the case, this Court noted that Pierce had 
not objected to the procedure at Hal and was thus "precluded from doing so roi • tu-
first time on appeal, .>> .;L v. *•*;.; '.:.L:; :U_>>. I.KT 
g r e d i . 1 : ' . : i • • h ' f.i- MlP i - 'K 
s •* i r> h^ .^ v-rntior / \cLordingly, the Court did not reach the issue. Id. 
A year later, in State v. Lesley, Lesley appealed the denial of his pretrial motion 
to suppress evidence seized from his backpack during a search incident to arrest. 
Lesley, 672 P.2d at 81. This Court iK-.d that * v -^ v ,->,w .,..;. preserver \\\- .iu 
because he had not pro\ ided tl ieCo i irt \ \, Ill: L ""' a i i } i m: i forrt Lation regard] ngahea i i ng 
c , -- \t .,..••, it'fi.r.w - h, •*.. * • Lie Court noted, 
"[T]he Rules d > not state that we may review alleged error when no objection at all 
is made at the trial level/' Id. jn quoted Pierce and explained that the claim did 
not rise to the level of a "great and manifest injustice." Id. at 81-82. It therefore did 
not reach the issue. Id. 
In State v. Archambeau, Archambeau appealed his conviction for possession of 
a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, claiming that the dangerous weapon 
statute infringed on his constitutional right to bear arms. Archambeau, 820 P.2d at 
922. In reviewing Archambeau's claim for plain error and exceptional 
circumstances, the court of appeals noted that exceptional circumstances are a 
"safety device to make certain that manifest injustice does not result from the failure 
to consider an issue on appeal." Id. 923. It then dropped a footnote to a string cite 
that included State v. Pierce. Id. at 923 n.5. The court did not reach Archambeau's 
constitutional claims. Id. at 922. 
In each of these three cases, the phrase "great and manifest injustice" was 
mentioned as a basis on which the court might reach an issue that the appellant had 
briefed, but had not first raised in the lower court. This Court has held, in fact, that 
"in most circumstances, the term 'manifest injustice' is synonymous with the 'plain 
error' standard." State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116,121-22 (Utah 1989); see also State v. 
Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT 29, 1 23, 94 P.3d 186 (noting that exceptional 
circumstances exception is reserved for "the most unusual circumstances where our 
failure to consider an issue that was not properly preserved for appeal would have 
resulted in manifest injustice"); State v. Arguelles, 2003 UT 1, % 43, 63 P.3d 731 
14 
.•t>f. •. . . ' .*di- MIS . -. h - - -, . r \ i i i ; r c n m f n plain err or analysis of death 
penalty cases, because to do so would "create a new form of review no longer based 
n manifest injustice"); State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d \ 8 (Utah \ 1 " ^ ' ^ ///nn1H 
exceptional circumstances concept serves as a "snfetv dovico " *~ assure ^ i f 
manifest injustice does not result from the failure tu uuib.uu- an ^>u, , .:pp 
i juulni^ AirlnitiibctiLi, SJil I J „it 92'^)). 
• i.^no -ivp^.>rtfr.rii-ir^//mardfestinjustice , /asabasisto 
raise and decide unbriefed issues. Neither does sound judicial policy. When an 
appellant fails to raise a claim on appeal, it is deemed waived and abandoned. See 
American Towers Owners Ass'n, Inc., 930 P.2d at 1 185 n.5 ('Issues not briefed by an 
appellant cire deemed waived and abandoned n anr* ,...;; _ . : 
si i bseq i • ^ s ai ill arg ties tl t. e ::l ai ixi foi 1:1 Le p ai t \ - inn akes its • B p >art ; • s 
ad vocate ' I his isbotl t, i n i wise ai id i u i i lecessary. 
''An independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice in our 
society." Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 1. "A [judge] is bound by his oath not to 
be of counsel in any quarrel that shall come before him" Papa v. Kt\, ridden 
Federation oj :.,:uu::-f ±^ : . . _a • • .. s > i t. * -
for h im * l -^ Toafv u-: rop>earance of partiality, and at worst render capricious 
and arbitrary judgments. See Jetz Services, Inc., v. Chamberlain, 812 S.W.2d 946, 948 
' • . • 1 5 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1991) ("The law is concerned not only with the judge's actual 
impartiality but also the public's perception of the judge's impartiality."). 
Moreover, there is little reason for reaching an abandoned issue for the sake of 
preventing manifest injustice. The failure to address an abandoned claim on appeal 
can never really result in "manifest injustice," because there is nothing unjust about 
an unfavorable decision for a party that abandoned its winning arguments on 
appeal. This is particularly true in the criminal context, where an appellant may 
remedy "manifest injustice" by filing a post-conviction petition based on ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel.4 
The State is unaware of any case in which this Court has sua sponte raised an 
abandoned issue on the basis of manifest injustice.5 When this Court has reached 
issues that parties have not raised, it has done so not to avoid manifest injustice to 
one of the parties, but rather, because doing so was "necessary to a proper 
4
 A civil litigant may remedy manifest injustice by bringing a malpractice 
claim against his appellate counsel. However, unlike a post-conviction petition, 
such a remedy does not provide the same result that a successful appeal would 
have. 
5
 In death penalty cases, this Court reserves the prerogative "to notice, 
consider, and correct manifest and prejudicial error which is not objected to at trial 
or assigned on appeal, but is palpably apparent on the face of the record." State v. 
Honie, 2002 UT 4, \ 16, 57 P.3d 977 (quotations omitted). The Court reserves this 
prerogative "because of the serious and permanent nature of the penalty imposed in 
such cases." State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546,552 (Utah 1987). The State is unaware of 
any case, however, in which this Court has actually exercised that prerogative. 
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i. .!M..: • v ^ ; V ; f i -mci* Tr:rn. 977R2d 4b2,463-64 (Utah 1998) 
(deciding, without briefing of is^ue, that trial ^ouii^ i^ie i i sanctions against 
attorney for wrongly garnishing a city's bank account were error because 
garnishment is not a pleading, motion, or other paper subject to rule 11 sanctions); 
see also Hilts ley e. Kyda, , ^ ; ._d , . , - J , .. _ ^ • everting ma. * .; 
: -• v i i^u.o - v/ . : . - — !» ^ • *y. <K)S DO • i - t ah ] 937) (vacating 1 ldieudrt 
judgment and remanding where court failed to make findings and conclusions in 
bench trial, even though neither party raised or briefed issue); Romrell v. Zions First 
National Bank, N.A., 611 P.2d 392,395 (Utah 1980) (reversing trial court for failure to 
make findings and conclusions where claim was raised roi 1;. w :ime in repl\ PI. ; 
granted, even though neither party raised or briefed issue).6 
these cases reprebuu 01 ii) nibidnces m w mui i.hib v. ULU ums reversed <i n -^ ei 
irt based on an claim neither party briefed. This Court ha^ always recognize* 1 its 
lit to ajfjftrm a lower court on any ground apparent in the record. N < Bniir.i r 
. ..ytes, 2002 UT 58 ,113 , 52 P.3d 1158. This is true, "even though such ground or 
theory [was] not urged or argued on appeal by appellee/' Limb v. Federated A \dk 
Producers Ass'1 1, Inc., 461 P.2d 290,293 n.2 (Utah 1969). This rule does not, however, 
"give appellate courts permission to search the record for alternate grounds to 
reverse a decision/' Bailey, 2002 UT 58 ,113 n.3. 
Although this Court has never specified what types of claims are "necessary 
to a proper decision," the above cases suggest that a claim is "necessary to a proper 
decision" only if it concerns an obvious, fundamental defect in the litigation that 
must be resolved before the appeal can continue. For example, in Acton, the trial 
court's failure to make findings and conclusions in a bench trial was "a fundamental 
defect that [made] it impossible to review the issues that were briefed without 
invading the trial court's fact-finding domain." Acton, 737 P.2d at 99. In Hiltsley, the 
Court could not adjudicate the rights of an absent party without that party being 
joined to the action. See Hiltsley, 738 P.2d at 1025 (citing Provident Tradesmans Bank & 
Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 111 (1968) ("When necessary . . . a court of 
appeals should, on its own initiative, take steps to protect the absent party, who of 
course had no opportunity to plead and prove his interest below.")). In Estes, the 
Court refused to decide the appeal when the litigation was premised on a claim 
unrecognized at law because "[i]t simply is not compatible with the rule of law that 
This Court has also addressed unbriefed claims where the claims were not 
central to the reasons for reversing a lower court. See Stuart, 2005 UT 13, % 22 
(reversing for lack of exigent circumstances, but discussing and rejecting claim 
under emergency aid doctrine that neither party raised or briefed); State v. Brake, 
2005 UT 95, % 12,103 P.3d 699 (discussing proper standard of review for search and 
seizure cases where neither party disputed standard of review). 
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: <: lip roreed " J rm \ " f i in pd without an allegation of a cause of action that 
is cognizable at law. ^ / P.2d at 13lb. 
The above cases concern instances in which this Court has reversed the low er 
court on a claim neither party raised. Additional guidelines for deciding unbrHK'd 
claims may be cuiicU from cases in u rn^ii tin^ ^ ,>i... na^ Ajjirmcu ., .-^w ^ .o.* i 
t, ,.t(J -j rj i r r . riTi.(1:^i ;. : 1 i c r ivpii c abi e to reversing a lower court onunbriefed 
claims. 
It is only appropriate to affirm a lower court on an unbriefed claim where the 
claim is "'apparent on the record/" Bailey r P»vle$, 20021 I 58,113, 32 * .'-d
 :- ^ 
(quoting Uipoma v. M^r.u,, _. •._/'; •.. . „ . ne jrrin., .-. ...: 
..p.-- - . • - ^i .\\ -. .. .-• ; i 'ienset • • * • ' * 
* •• I«^M1 «ht •.!-;.- • -*K h *• .itHrm decisions below." Id. a t l 13n.3. hxBauey 
this Court held that the alternate ground relied uii by the court of appeals was 
apparent in the record because both parties had litigated the alternate ground in the 
trial court and the record was "rite u »111 retereru es u > nu ul Lernate ground . 1 d,, at 1 
See Bailei fv/Bm dt is, 2001 [ Jl \ pp 3 4 f l 8 1 81 " 3 i l 1 29(E). n • is J lissenting). 
lb be apparent on the record, an alternate ground should also be based on 
well-established law. The affirm on any ground rule "does not give appellate courts 
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license to pull from thin air alternate or novel legal theories/7 Bailey, 2002 UT 58, \ 
13 n.3; see also Alverado v. Wash. Pub. Power Supply Sys., 759 P.2d 427,429-30 (Wash. 
1988) (en banc) (holding that courts should only reach unbriefed issues when "there 
is no dispute about the law"). 
This Court also stated in Bailey that affirming on an alternate ground might 
necessitate supplemental briefing. "[S]ound and prudent appellate practice and 
procedure might dictate that the appellate court afford the parties and opportunity 
to address and argue an alternate legal theory or ground in supplemental briefs to 
the court." Bailey, 2002 "UT 58 ,113 n.3. "Such a practice might act to placate the 
parties' legitimate concerns regarding timely and adequate notice and opportunity 
to be heard in a meaningful way without necessarily sacrificing the goal of judicial 
economy embodied in the 'affirm on any ground rule /" Id. 
In the instant case, the court of appeals' holding that the bad check statute 
requires a substantially contemporaneous exchange was not "necessary to a proper 
decision." Unlike the absence of an essential party or inadequate findings and 
conclusions, the possible lack of a factual basis in the plea presents no obstacle to the 
court rendering a proper decision a decision on the merits. Lack of a factual basis 
for a guilty plea, like any other claim, can be waived. See State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 
74, 1 11, 10 P.3d 346. Where a defendant claims lack of a factual basis, but 
inadequately briefs the claim on appeal, the court should simply hold that the 
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defendant's claims are inadequately briefed, or resolve them on the merits to the 
extent that he has briefed them, and then affirm his conviction. See State v. Gamblin, 
2000 UT 44, ff 7-8,1 P.3d 1108 (holding that court need not consider defendant's 
claim of an involuntary guilty plea where defendant inadequately briefed . \. ]^e 
court does not need to reach out, ab tri, . . M . - . J I ^ppca^-.;. ; : . ^ .» -. .: 
2002 I JT 58 1 II 3 n 5 (noti ng that the affirm on any ground rule ''does not give 
appellate courts license to pull from thin air alternate or novel legal theories"). 
The basis for reversing the trial court was also not apparent in the ivu ] 
Neither party had ever discussed the need for a substantially contemporaneous 
exchange. Ii i . ,. .*,. < . acruki^r.. j ^c ra 'U i.at 1; le issued tl le cl leek f ::)r 
~ r *-•-.' •''•» * -t +h chronoloev >t the transaction, ihe State had no 
notice and no opportunity to respond to the claim that the bad check staiuic 
requires a substantially contemporaneous exchange. Moreover, as explained further 
in Point I B, the "substantially contemporaneous exchange"' \\n> appjn. u m the 
cour t is ai i) thii i,g but \ v ell establisl led ii i U tal t 
"iven regarding unbriefed claims. Rather than declaring defendant's claims 
abandoned and affirming the conviction, the court assumed a position of advocacy 
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on behalf of defendant and created a new rule of law in order to vindicate him. The 
court's action was not justified by resort to the plain error doctrine. Nor was 
resolution of the claim was "necessary to a proper decision." The claim was also not 
apparent in the record. The court of appeals should have simply held that there was 
no error in defendant's guilty plea or that his arguments were inadequately briefed 
and affirmed his conviction. At the very least, it should have requested 
supplemental briefing from the parties. See Bailey, 2002 "UT 58, % 13 n.3 (noting that 
in reaching unbriefed issues, "sound and prudent appellate practice and procedure 
might dictate that the appellate court afford the parties and opportunity to address 
and argue an alternate legal theory or ground in supplemental briefs to the court"). 
The court's failure to dismiss defendant's claim or to request supplemental briefing 
constitutes an abuse of distraction, and this Court should therefore reverse. 
B. Even if the court of appeals properly raised a novel question of 
law on the basis of "great and manifest injustice," it erred in 
applying the manifest injustice standard. 
Even if "great and manifest injustice" were a proper standard for deciding an 
unbriefed issue, the court of appeals erred in applying that standard. As explained 
in Point LA, manifest injustice is essentially plain error. See Verde, 770 P.2d at 121-
22. Plain error requires both obviousness and harm. See State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, % 
15,95P.3d276. 
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An error is obvious if "the trial court should have been aware that an error 
was being committed at the time." State v, Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 122 n. 11 (Utah 1 r,c:cM 
This requires that "the law governing the error [be] clear at the time t l " n ^ r ^ d 
error was made." Dean, _* - _ i • • i IO; sccaho btaic v. tidredge, * * M '.2d, 29, J'I ih 
(Ulali IMSM) (i\iftvtJiiit; J i Linn ul plain uuui t'"" IICJC a dispositive appcllah1 K ase had 
i in ot ; • et beei i decid ed). 
In the instant case, the court of appeals' determined that defendant's plea 
lacked a factual basis because the facts averred at the plea hearing did tlot 
demonstrate a "substantially contemporaneous exchange." Robison, 2005 UT App 9, 
^ will be explained more ;iiii* i. ,^ . , h v. tar. .-> u^c* viicck >tatutL does ,o: 
_ ' \ p i C > ^ ' ' ^ M ' • " . i ' ! ; U * J M lull ^ l f' v • , 1 
. . . ui^ money propertv, or other thing of value/' Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-502^1; 
(West 2004). Further, no Ut J. -urf has ever heL: ••• •• substantially 
contemporaneous exchange is a dispositive element of the crime of issuing a bad 
check. By requiring a substantially contemporaneous exenange, partK ...Mr,. 
\ 11 error cannot be obvious if the court must adopt a new rule of law to find the 
error. 
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The error is also not obvious from the single case, Howells, Inc. v. Nelson, 565 
P.2d 1147,1149 (Utah 1977), cited by the court of appeals. See Robison, 2005 UT App 
9,2. Howells does not even discuss a substantially contemporaneous exchange rule. 
Howells filed a civil action to recover on a worthless check given as payment on a 
past due account. See Howells, 565 P.2d at 1149. As part of its action to recover, 
Howells alleged fraud. Id. This Court held that no fraud occurred because payment 
on a past due account does not induce the payee to give anything of value. Id. In 
other words, Howells was not cheated or adversely affected by the worthless check 
because the account remained as it was, past due. Id. This holding interpreting 
common law fraud does not make it obvious to trial courts that the bad check 
statute requires a substantially contemporaneous exchange. This is particularly true 
where the bad check statute does not require an intent to defraud.7 
Not only was the purported error not obvious, it was not harmful. An error is 
harmful if it is '"of such a magnitude that there is a reasonable likelihood of a more 
favorable outcome for the defendant/" Dean, 2004 UT 63, \ 22 (quoting State v. 
7
 Intent to defraud was an element of the crime of passing a bad check before 
1973. The legislature removed the intent to defraud element when it reenacted the 
Utah Criminal Code in 1973. Compare 1969 Utah Laws ch. 239 § 1 with 1973 Utah 
Laws ch. 196 § 76-6-505. 
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Evans, 2001 UT 22,116,20 P.3d 888). It must be shown that the error affected the 
outcome of the plea process. Id. at % 23. 
Defendant was not harmed by the trial court's purported error because the 
statutory elements were satisfied here. The statute requires merely that the check 
issue "for the purpose of obtaining . . . any money, property, or other thing of 
value." Utah Code Ann. §76-6-505(1). As the dissent noted, "the trial court was 
well aware of the complete context of [defendant]'s actions from the various pretrial 
pleadings and the in-court testimony of the victim at a prior motion hearing." 
Robison, 2005 UT App 9, 4. Those pleadings and the prior motion hearing 
demonstrated that both the court and defendant were aware of facts proffered by 
the State that clearly proved that defendant issued the check "for the purpose of 
obtaining" the truck. Id. Those facts include that defendant and the victim had 
never transacted business before, that defendant took the truck only to show it to a 
potential customer, that the time period between when defendant picked the truck 
up and when he mailed the bad check to the victim was only ten days, and that the 
victim did not give defendant the title to the truck until he received the bad check. 
Id at 5. 
Thus, both the court and defendant knew that there were facts alleged to 
demonstrate that the check was issued for the purpose of obtaining the truck and 
that under those facts defendant did indeed commit a crime. Even if the court had 
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required a more thorough articulation of the facts during the plea hearing, 
defendant would not have altered his plea because he already understood the facts 
on which the State based the charge. 
II. A SUBSTANTIALLY CONTEMPORANEOUS EXCHANGE IS 
NOT A DISPOSITIVE ELEMENT OF THE CRIME OF ISSUING 
A BAD CHECK 
Before considering the adequacy of the factual basis underlying defendant's 
plea, the court of appeals noted that one of the elements of the crime of issuing a 
bad check is that the check issue "'for the purpose of obtaining from any person, 
firm, partnership, or corporation, any money, property, or other thing of value/" 
Robison, 2005 UT App 9 at 2 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505). Then, without 
further analysis or citation to authority, the court held, "We conclude that this 
element of [the bad check statute] requires a substantially contemporaneous 
exchange/7 Id. This was error. 
The question of whether the crime of issuing a bad check requires a 
substantially contemporaneous exchange is one of statutory interpretation that this 
Court reviews for correctness. See State v. husk, 2001 UT 102, \ 11, 37 P.3d 1103 
"When interpreting statutes, we determine the statute's meaning by first 
looking to the statute's plain language, and give effect to the plain language unless 
the language is ambiguous." Blackner v. Dep't ofTransp., 2002 UT 44,f12,48 P.3d 
949. The Court's primary goal "is to give effect to the legislative intent, as evidenced 
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by the plain language, in light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve/7 
State v. Burns, 2000 UT 56,125,4 R3d 795. The Court reads the statutory language 
so as "'to render all parts [of the statute] relevant and meaningful/" State v. Maestas, 
2002 UT 123, J 52, 63 P.3d 621 (quoting Utah v. Tooele County, 2002 UT 8,110,44 
P.3d 680) (emphasis and brackets in Maestas). Accordingly, "'effect must be given, if 
possible, to every word, clause, and sentence of a statute No clause [,] sentence 
or word shall be construed as superfluous, void or insignificant if the construction 
can be found which will give force to and preserve all the words of the statute/" Id. 
at % 53 (quoting Norman J. Singer, 2A Sutherland Statutory Construction §46:06 (4th 
ed. 1984)). 
Nothing in the plain language of the bad check statute requires the check to 
issue contemporaneously with the value received. It requires only that the check 
issue "for the purpose of obtaining from any person, firm, partnership, or 
corporation, any money, property, or other thing of value or paying for any services, 
wages, salary, labor, or rent." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505(1) (West 2004). This 
element defines the requisite mental state of the offender. The interval of time 
between obtaining the thing of value and issuing the check is but one factor to 
consider in determining in determining that mental state—it is not the dispositive 
factor. The ultimate question is whether the defendant issued the check for the 
purpose of obtaining something of value. This requires the fact-finder to consider 
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all of the evidence that bears on the offender's intent, not just the chronology of the 
transaction. 
Moreover, requiring a substantially contemporaneous exchange is contrary to 
the intent of the statute, because it suggests that the crime of issuing a bad check 
requires the defendant to actually obtain something of value. It shifts the focus from 
the defendant's intent to whether he succeeded in realizing that intent. Under the 
statute, the offender need not actually obtain the thing he seeks, nor must the bad 
check be exchanged for the thing he seeks—he need only issue the check "for the 
purpose of obtaining" something of value. Utah Code Ann. §76-6-505(1). 
The lone case cited by the court of appeals does not support requiring a 
substantially contemporaneous exchange in every bad check case. As explained in 
Point I.C, Howells, Inc. v. Nelson, does not discuss a substantially contemporaneous 
exchange rule. Rather, it considered the question of whether a bad check issued as 
payment on a past due account constituted fraud upon the creditor. See Howells, 
Inc., 565 P.2d at 1149. 
Nor is there any support in other states for the court of appeals' holding. 
Only three states have adopted a contemporaneous transaction rule. See Ledford v. 
State, 362 S.E.2d 133,134 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987); State v. Rojas-Cardona, 503 N.W.2d 591, 
595 (Iowa 1993), overruled on other grounds by State v. Hogrefe, 557 N.W.2d 871, 879 
(Iowa 1996); State v. Piatt, 845 P.2d 815, 817 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992). In each of those 
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states, however, the bad check statute requires that the check issue "'in exchange for 
a present consideration or wages /" Ledford, 362 P.2d at 556 (quoting Ga. Code Ann. 
§ 16-9-20(a)); see also Rojas-Cardon, 503 N.W.2d at 594 ("Theft by check is committed 
under Iowa Code section 714.1(6) when a person 'makes, utters, draws, delivers, or 
gives any check . . . on any bank . . . and obtains property or service in exchange 
therefore '" (alterations in original)); Piatt, 845 P.2d at 816 ("The Worthless 
Checks Act makes it a crime: 'for a person to issue in exchange for anything of 
value, with intent to defraud, any check . . . ' " (quoting N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-36-4)). 
Thus, the contemporaneous exchange rule in those states arises from an element in 
the statute requiring a physical act of exchanging the check for something of value. 
It does not follow from those cases that the mental state of acting with the purpose 
to obtain something of value must be proven by the physical act of a substantially 
contemporaneous exchange. 
Because the bad check statute does not require a "substantially 
contemporaneous exchange," the court of appeals erred in reversing defendant's 
guilty plea. Defendant admitted that he issued a bad check for the purpose of 
obtaining property (R. 246). His pre-plea claims that he was merely paying a debt 
on an open account did not obviate his subsequent admission (R. 398:6, 20-21). 
Defendant also knew, after sitting through two preliminary hearings and a motion 
hearing, that there was evidence that he had issued the check for the purpose of 
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obtaining the truck. Particularly, he issued the check a mere ten days after picking 
up the truck and did not receive the title to the truck until he gave Painter the 
second bad check (R. 396:11-12,18-19). There was no basis for the court to reverse 
his plea, and this Court should therefore reverse the court of appeals. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to reverse 
the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Respectfully submitted August 23,2005. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
MATTHEW D. BATES 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Petitioner 
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DAVIS, Judge: 
James L. Robison appeals the trial court's denial ofvhis 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea to one count of issuing a bad 
check. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505 (2003).x We reverse. 
Robison generally argues that the trial court erred by 
failing to comply with rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure when it accepted his guilty plea. Specifically, 
Robison asserts that his plea does not constitute an admission of 
all of the elements of the offense of issuing a bad check. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505. We do not necessarily disagree with 
the dissent's conclusion that Robison did not adequately present 
this issue either to the trial court or to this court. However, 
to avoid a "great and manifest injustice," we will reach this 
issue sua sponte as an exception to the preservation rule. State 
v. Pierce, 655 P.2d 676, 677 (Utah 1982) (per curiam) (stating 
that appellate court can reach an issue sua sponte as an 
exception to the preservation rule if a "great and manifest 
1. Because this statute has not changed since Robison was 
charged and convicted, we cite to the most recent version for 
convenience. 
injustice" would otherwise occur); see also State v. Archambeau, 
820 P.2d 920, 923 n.5 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (citing Pierce and 
noting parenthetically that "court can entertain an exception sua 
sponte if facts reveal 'great and manifest injustice' would 
otherwise occur" (quoting Pierce, 655 P.2d at 677)) . We agree 
with Robison that his conviction is based upon a guilty plea that 
does not contain an admission to all the elements of the offense 
of issuing a bad check. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505. In good 
conscience, we cannot affirm Robison!s conviction of a crime 
that, according to the plea colloquy, he did not commit. 
Rule 11 provides, in relevant part, that a trial court may 
not accept a defendant's guilty plea until the court has found 
that the plea is an admission of all the elements of the offense 
to which the plea is entered. See Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e), 
(e) (4) (A) . One of the required elements of issuing a bad check 
under section 76-6-505 is that the defendant must issue a bad 
check "for the purpose of obtaining from any person, firm, 
partnership, or corporation, any money, property, or other thing 
of value." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505(1), (2). We conclude that 
this element of section 76-6-505 requires a substantially 
contemporaneous exchange. 
During Robison's plea colloquy, Robison admitted that he 
issued a bad check. However, when the trial court specifically 
asked Robison whether it was correct that the vehicle was 
delivered to him "in exchange for" the bad check, Robison 
replied, "No. The car was delivered several weeks prior to 
[issuance of the bad check] . "2 We conclude that this statement 
represents a complete defense to the charge of issuing a bad 
check under section 76-6-505, because it establishes that there 
was not a substantially contemporaneous exchange--i.e., because 
Robison received the vehicle several weeks prior to issuing the 
bad check, he did not issue the bad check "for the purpose of 
obtaining" the vehicle. Id. The check was irrelevant to the 
transaction involving the sale of the vehicle and simply amounted 
to payment on an open account. See Howells, Inc. v. Nelson, 565 
P.2d 1147, 1149 (Utah 1977) (holding that a bad check issued for 
payment on a past due account for goods already received did not 
constitute an exchange for property because the payee was "not 
induced to give anything of value, nor was it in any way cheated 
or adversely affected by the giving of the check"). 
2. During Robison's plea colloquy, he also characterized his 
issuance of the check as payment "on an existing debt." 
3. The dissent recognizes this principle from Howells, Inc. v. 
Nelson, 565 P.2d 1147, 1149 (Utah 1977), but then proceeds to 
(continued...) 
20030189-CA 2 
Because Robison's guilty plea was not an admission of all 
the elements of the offense of issuing a bad check, see Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-505; we conclude that the trial court erred by 
accepting his plea and by denying his subsequent motion to 
withdraw his plea. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's 
denial of Robison's motion to withdraw his guilty plea and remand 
for a trial. 
I CONCUR: 
P~&6t m. ^QULL*/) 
Judith M. Billings, 
Presiding Judge 
THORNE, Judge (dissenting): 
James Robison pleaded guilty to issuing a bad check and 
admitted facts sufficient to establish each element of that 
crime. Robison's appellate arguments to the contrary are 
inadequately briefed, lack any reasoned analysis or citation to 
relevant case law, and shift the burden of research and analysis 
to this court. I would reject them on that basis. See Utah R. 
3. (...continued) 
rely upon cases from other jurisdictions to support the 
proposition that a "short delay" between the receipt of goods and 
the issuance of a check may still satisfy the exchange 
requirement. We are not persuaded by the dissent's reliance upon 
these cases that turn on their unique facts. 
The dissent also relies upon State v. Bartholomew, 724 P.2d 
352 (Utah 1986), in which the Utah Supreme Court affirmed a 
defendant's conviction for issuing a bad check when the defendant 
issued the check one week after receiving stock shares. See id. 
at 352, 355. However, Bartholomew does not specifically address 
the issue of a substantially contemporaneous exchange, but 
instead focuses upon whether a thing of value was received. See 
id. at 354-55. We are equally unpersuaded by the dissent's 
reliance upon Bartholomew, 
20030189-CA 3 
App. P. 24; State v. Sloan, 2003 UT App 170,^13, 72 P.3d 138. 
Further, I see no injustice to Robison in this matter and must 
respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. 
The majority opinion concludes that, as a legal matter, 
Robison did not admit to a factual basis for the crime of issuing 
a bad check because, at his plea hearing, he admitted only to 
writing a check "on an existing debt" and that the truck in 
question had been delivered "several weeks prior to" the issuance 
of the check. Generally speaking, Utah law provides that the 
writing of a check on a past due account for goods already 
received does not constitute an exchange "for the purpose of 
obtaining . . . any money, property, or other thing of value," 
see Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505 (2003), because the payee is "not 
induced to give anything of value, nor [is he] in any way cheated 
or adversely affected by the giving of the check." Howells, Inc. 
v. Nelson, 565 P.2d 1147, 1149 (Utah 1977). However, in the 
context of Robison's plea hearing, it is clear that Robison's 
answers provided the trial court with a factual basis upon which 
to accept his guilty plea. 
1. Robison's Factual Admissions at the Plea Hearing 
At his plea hearing, Robison never asserted that he had an 
open account with his victim, nor did he or his counsel ever 
alert the judge to any potential conflict between Robison's 
admitted conduct and the statutory language. To the contrary, 
Robison admitted in writing at the plea hearing that he was aware 
of and understood the "for the purpose of obtaining property" 
element of the bad check charge and that there was a factual 
basis for that element. Robison waived his right to have the 
State prove each element of the offense to a jury beyond a 
reasonable doubt, both in writing and orally on the record. 
Based on these and other admissions and waivers, the trial court 
accepted Robison's guilty plea. 
The majority opinion relies in part on Robison's assertion 
at the plea hearing that his dheck was issued to pay "on an 
existing debt." Robison's statement to this effect occurred 
outside the formal factual basis colloquy and prior to his 
decision to plead guilty to a crime, his decision of what crime 
to plead to, and his written admission of factual guilt of the 
bad check charge. When Robison made the "existing debt" comment, 
he still had the right to present inconsistent theories or 
defenses.1 The trial court was under no obligation to consider 
1. See State v. Mitcheson, 560 P.2d 1120, 1122 (Utah 1977) 
("[The State's burden of proof] gives the defendant the benefit 
(continued...) 
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such inconsistencies once Robison decided to plead guilty to the 
bad check charge and proceeded with the formal plea process, 
including submitting his formal factual admissions as required by 
Rule 11. 
At the plea hearing, prior to the trial court's acceptance 
of his plea, Robison signed a statement in support of plea. He 
adopted this statement on the record. The typed statement had 
handwritten corrections to reflect the last-minute change from a 
no contest plea to a guilty plea, although some typed references 
to a no contest plea remained. Corrected to reflect Robison1s 
actual plea of guilty, the statement contained the following 
admissions: 
I have received a copy of the (Amended) 
Information against me. I have read it, or 
had it read to me, and I understand the 
nature and the elements of crime(s) to which 
I am pleading [guilty] or no contest. 
The elements of the crime(s) to which I 
am pleading [guilty] are: 
Count I: That I, JAMES L. ROBISON, on 
or about September 11, 2001, in Juab 
County, State of Utah, did issue a check 
for the payment of money for the purpose 
of obtaining- property knowing that it 
would not be paid by the drawee and 
payment was refused. 
I understand that by pleading guilty, I am 
not contesting that I committed the foregoing 
crimes. I stipulate and agree that if I am 
pleading guilty, I do not dispute or contest 
that the following facts describe my conduct 
. . . . These facts provide a basis for the 
court to accept my [guilty] plea and prove 
the elements of crime(s) to which I am 
pleading [guilty]: 
On or about September 11, 2 0 01, in Juab 
County, State of Utah, I issued a check 
for the payment of money for the purpose 
of obtaining- property knowing that it 
would not be paid by the drawee and 
payment was refused. 
1. (...continued) 
of every defense thereto which may cause a reasonable doubt to 
exist as to his guilt, arising either from the evidence, or lack 
of evidence, in the case; and this is true whether his defenses 
are consistent or not." (emphasis added) (citations omitted)). 
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(Emphases added.) The trial court expressly asked Robison if he 
had any questions about this written statement, and, except for a 
restitution matter, he did not. The court proceeded to question 
Robison about his plea decision and, upon satisfying itself that 
Robison was acting knowingly and voluntarily, accepted his plea 
of guilty. 
After accepting the plea, the trial court conducted the 
following colloquy to establish its factual basis: 
The Judge: Factual basis, Mr. Leavitt? 
[Prosecutor] Mr. Leavitt: Your honor, 
on the date set forth in the Information this 
defendant, James L. Robison, issued a check 
or a draft a, in exchange for something of 
value at a time when the account upon which 
it was written was closed, and the amount 
exceeded $5,000 . 
Defendant: That is not a correct 
statement, Your Honor. 
The Judge: What is a correct statement, 
Mr.--
Defendant: Well, I have a letter from 
the . . . . The correct statement is that 
account was not closed, the--
The Judge: Well-r 
Defendant: --payment was not, was not 
honored by the bank but the account was not 
closed. I have a letter in my file from the 
institution stating that it was open. 
The Judge: Okay. You, you did issue a 
check which was not honored by your bank. Is 
that correct? 
Defendant: That's correct. 
The Judge: And a, upon notice of it not 
being honored did you, did you at any time 
make that check good? 
Defendant: I attempted to, Your Honor, 
and my bonding company also attempted to, but 
we were not able to completely do it. 
The Judge: Okay. And a, in exchange 
for that a car was delivered. Is that 
correct? A vehicle was--
Defendant: No. The car was delivered 
several weeks prior to that. 
The Judge: Well, I mean--
Defendant: There was a vehicle in, a 
transaction did involve a vehicle. 
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The Judge: Yes. Okay. And that 
vehicle had a value in excess of $5,000? 
Defendant: It did, Your Honor. 
Based on this colloquy, the trial court found that there was a 
factual basis for Robison's guilty plea. 
2. Robison's Admissions Alone Support His Plea 
There is nothing in Robison's written or oral statements at 
the plea hearing, and certainly nothing in the formal factual 
colloquy, to establish a factual or legal defense to a bad check 
charge. While alleging a short delay between physical delivery 
of the truck and his issuance of the check, Robison failed to 
allege that the victim was not "cheated or adversely affected by 
the giving of the check." Howells, Inc. v. Nelson, 565 P. 2d 
1147, 1149 (Utah 1977). As detailed later in this opinion, the 
record as a whole reflects that the victim had retained legal 
title to the truck and was only induced to provide it to Robison 
upon the issuance of the bad check. Even assuming the trial 
court could not consider this record evidence for purposes of 
accepting Robison's plea, Robison's failure to deny cheating or 
adversely affecting the victim, his admission of a transaction 
involving the truck, and his factual admission of his "purpose of 
obtaining property" provide more than enough factual basis to 
satisfy Rule ll.2 
Even if the sole factor to be considered was the passage of 
time, there is no precedent establishing that a delay between 
receipt of property and issuance of a check automatically 
precludes a bad check conviction. To the contrary, in State v. 
Bartholomew, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed a bad check 
conviction resulting from the issuance of a check one week after 
the receipt of stock shares by the defendant. See 724 P.2d 352, 
352 (Utah 1986). I see no meaningful distinction between the one 
week delay implicitly approved in Bartholomew and the "several 
2. Given Robison's written and oral admissions over the course 
of the plea hearing, I am also inclined to find that Robison is 
estopped from raising the factual basis argument on appeal. The 
elements of equitable estoppel are: "(1) an admission, statement 
or act inconsistent with the claim afterwards asserted, (2) 
action by the other party on the faith of such admission, 
statement or act, and (3) injury to such other party resulting 
from allowing the first party to contradict or repudiate such 
admission, statement or act." Department of Human Servs. v. 
Irizarry, 945 P.2d 676, 680 (Utah 1997). Each of these elements 
is arguably present in this matter. 
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weeks" delay3 asserted by Robison in the fact colloquy. So long 
as there is, as Robison admitted at his plea hearing, but a 
single "transaction," I do not view the delay in this matter as 
falling outside the legislature's intention or the rule set forth 
in Howells. See 565 P.2d at 1149. Any distinction that might be 
drawn certainly fails to give rise to "great and manifest 
injustice" as relied upon by the majority opinion.4 
3. The record reveals an actual delay of ten days between 
Robison taking physical possession of the truck and his writing a 
bad check in payment for it. 
4. State v. Bartholomew, 724 P.2d 352 (Utah 1986), did not 
explicitly address the contemporaneous exchange requirement, but 
the failure of the supreme court to identify and address the 
issue suggests that it would not find Robison's situation to be 
one of manifest injustice. 
Other states addressing' this issue have expressly concluded 
that a short delay between the receipt of goods and the issuance 
of a check may still satisfy the exchange requirement: 
Where a worthless check is given as payment 
for goods already received, there is no 
present consideration, and a conviction for 
criminal issuance of a bad check must be 
reversed unless "the interval [between 
delivery of goods or services and payment 
therefor] is slight and the exchange can be 
characterized as a single contemporaneous 
transaction." 
Ledford v. State, 362 S.E.2d 133, 134 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987) 
(emphasis added) (alteration in original) (citations omitted); 
see also State v. Piatt, 845 P'.2d 815, 817 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992) 
(holding that "a worthless check is given for something of value 
if the worthless check is issued as part of a contemporaneous 
transaction between the parties in which something of value is 
exchanged for the check, without regard to whether the thing of 
value is delivered before or after the worthless check is 
issued"). Ledford addressed a payment by check one day after the 
receipt of goods, see 3 62 S.E.2d at 133-34, while in Piatt the 
defendant issued a bad check fourteen days after the receipt of 
goods and services. See 845 P.2d at 816. Both cases found their 
particular facts sufficient to support a bad check conviction 
under a single contemporaneous transaction standard. See also 
Gillev v. State, 356 S.E.2d 655, 656 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987) (finding 
contemporaneous transaction where work completed on Friday and 
check delivered the following Monday). 
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3. The Record as a Whole Demonstrates Facts Placing Robison's 
Actions Squarely Within the Purview of the Bad Check Statute 
As stated above, I would hold that Robison's plea has 
adequate factual support solely from the facts admitted at the 
plea hearing. However, given the majority's decision to examine 
Robison's claims under the "great and manifest injustice" 
standard, it is appropriate to examine the remainder of the 
record to fill in the details of the transaction underlying 
Robison's plea. Those details reveal a very different version of 
events than those argued by Robison on appeal. And, unlike this 
court, the trial court was well aware of the complete context of 
Robison's actions from various pretrial pleadings and the in-
court testimony of the victim at a prior motion hearing.5 
Robison and his victim had never met prior to the truck 
transaction, and there were no prior vehicle transactions between 
the two. Robison first contacted the victim by phone6 around the 
end of July 2001 to request the victim's assistance in selling a 
separate vehicle. In mid-August, Robison again spoke with the 
victim seeking to locate a suitable truck for a potential buyer. 
The victim located the truck through his wholesaler network and 
ordered it for Robison. 
Robison took physical possession of the truck on approval 
for his customer on September" 1, 2001. That same day, Robison 
informed the victim that his customer was interested in buying 
the truck, and the victim agreed to send Robison the title and 
paperwork7 once Robison provided a check. On September 11, the 
victim contacted Robison about payment, and Robision agreed to 
send the victim a check, which he did. The victim only sent, 
i.e., was "induced to give," Robison title to the trufck after 
5. The contextual facts recited in this section of the opinion 
are taken from pleadings and exhibits filed in this action, 
seeking to determine proper possession of the truck as between 
competing third party claimants. At the hearing on this dispute, 
the victim in this matter gave extensive testimony about the 
facts, circumstances, and timing of the truck transaction. 
6. The victim testified that he spoke with Robison four or five 
times on the phone prior to September 1, 2001. 
7. Exhibits to prior pleadings demonstrate that title to the 
truck was not even issued to the victim, and thus could not have 
been transferred to Robison, until September 5, 2001. Similarly, 
the sales contract contemplated a cash sale of the truck to 
Robison on September 11 for $40,812. 
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Robison issued a bad check in payment. Howells, 565 P.2d at 
1149. 
These supporting facts strongly suggest that Robison!s 
issuance of a bad check was not merely substantially but actually 
in exchange for title to, rather than mere physical possession 
of, the truck. If Robison believed that these or other facts 
conflicted with the legal elements of a bad check charge, he 
should have expressly raised the issue at the trial court level. 
Had he done so, the facts could have been sifted and justice 
assured. Doing this type of analysis at the appellate level, 
without the benefit of trial court 'fact sifting,' is 
problematic. 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, even assuming that the relevant time 
period is the ten-day delay between Robison's initial physical 
receipt of the truck and his issuance of a bad check, I would 
affirm the trial court. Under my reading of Utah law, the court 
was justified in accepting Robison's plea solely based on his 
admissions that he had issued a check that had not been honored, 
that the check was issued in a transaction involving the recent 
receipt of a truck, and that the truck had a value in excess of 
$5,000. The record further indicates that Robison issued the 
check prior to and in exchange for the title and other paperwork 
that established legal transfer of ownership of the truck to 
Robison. 
I see no injustice, great or otherwise, in holding Robison 
to his guilty plea and would accordingly affirm the trial court's 
denial of Robison's motion to withdraw. 
William A. Thome Jr. { Judge 
20030189-CA 10 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 13th day of January, 2005, a true 
and correct copy of the attached DECISION was deposited in the 
United States mail or placed in Interdepartmental mailing to be 
delivered to: 
MILTON T HARMON 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
36 S MAIN ST 
P O BOX 97 
NEPHI UT 84648 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
MATTHEW D BATES 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
160 E 300 S 6TH FL 
PO BOX 140854 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0854 
HONORABLE DONALD J. EYRE JR. 
FOURTH DISTRICT, NEPHI DEPT 
PO BOX 249 
160 N MAIN 
NEPHI UT 84 64 8 
Judicial Secretary 
TRIAL COURT: FOURTH DISTRICT, NEPHI DEPT, 011600120 
APPEALS CASE NO.: 20030189-CA 
Addendum B 
§ 7 6 - 6 - 5 0 5 . Issuing a bad check or draft—Presumption 
(1) Any person who issues or passes a check or draft for the payment of 
money, for the purpose of obtaining from any person, firm, partnership, or 
corporation, any money, property, or other thing of value or paying for any 
services, wages, salary, labor, or rent, knowing it will not be^paid by the drawee 
and payment is refused by the drawee, is guilty of issuing a bad check or draft. 
For purposes of this subsection, a person who issues a check or draft for 
which payment is refused by the drawee is presumed to know the check or 
draft would not be paid if he had no account with the drawee at the time of 
issue. 
(2) Any person who issues or passes a check or draft for the payment of 
money, for the purpose of obtaining from any person, firm, partnership, or 
corporation, any money, property, or other thing of value or paying for any 
services, wages, salary, labor, or" rent, payment of which check or draft is 
legally refused by the drawee, is guilty of issuing a bad check or draft if he fails 
to make good and actual payment to the payee in the amount of the refused 
check or draft within 14 days of his receiving actual notice of the check or 
draft's nonpayment. 
(3) An offense of issuing a bad check or draft shall be punished as follows: 
(a) If the check or draft or series of checks or drafts made or drawn in this 
state within a period not exceeding six months amounts to a sum that is less 
than $300, the offense is a class B misdemeanor. 
(b) If the check or draft or checks or drafts made or drawn in this state 
within a period not exceeding six months amounts to a sum that is or exceeds 
$300 but is less than $1,000, the offense is a class A misdemeanor. 
(c) If the check or draft or checks or drafts made or drawn in this state 
within a period not exceeding six months amounts to a sum that is or exceeds 
$1,000 but is less than $5,000, the offense is a felony of the third degree. 
(d) If the check or draft or checks or drafts made or drawn in this state 
within a period not exceeding six months amounts to a sum that is or exceeds 
$5,000, the offense is a second degree felony. 
